How Do Strategic Factor Markets Respond to Rivalry in the Product Market? by Chatain, Olivier
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Management Papers Wharton Faculty Research
12-2014
How Do Strategic Factor Markets Respond to
Rivalry in the Product Market?
Olivier Chatain
University of Pennsylvania
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.upenn.edu/mgmt_papers
Part of the Business Administration, Management, and Operations Commons
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. http://repository.upenn.edu/mgmt_papers/31
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Chatain, O. (2014). How Do Strategic Factor Markets Respond to Rivalry in the Product Market?. Strategic Management Journal, 35
(13), 1952-1971. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/smj.2188
How Do Strategic Factor Markets Respond to Rivalry in the Product
Market?
Abstract
This paper explores the interplay between product market, strategic factor market, and resource development.
More competition in the product market makes resource buyers bid higher for resources, as the value of trying
to preempt the resources is higher. Holding other initial conditions constant, resources are developed more in
industries with factor markets than in industries without. When buyers of resources cannot integrate more
than one resource, developers choose to develop either at a low or high level, generating a type of
heterogeneity that would not arise otherwise. Changes in the intensity of competition in the product market
can have the opposite effect on resource development efforts depending on the presence or absence of factor
markets.
Keywords
strategic factor markets, resource development, rivalry, product market competition, formal foundations of
strategy
Disciplines
Business Administration, Management, and Operations
This journal article is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/mgmt_papers/31
How Do Strategic Factor Markets Respond
to Rivalry in the Product Market?
Olivier Chatain∗
July 5, 2013
Abstract
This paper explores the interplay between product market, strategic factor market and resource
development. More competition in the product market makes resource buyers bid higher for
resources, as the value of trying to preempt the resources is higher. Holding other initial condi-
tions constant, resources are developed more in industries with factor markets than in industries
without. When buyers of resources cannot integrate more than one resource, developers choose
to develop either at a low or high level, generating a type of heterogeneity that would not arise
otherwise. Changes in the intensity of competition in the product market can have opposite
effect on resource development efforts depending on the presence or absence of factor markets.
Keywords: Strategic factor markets, Resource development, Rivalry, Product market competi-
tion, Formal foundations of strategy
∗Management Department, The Wharton School, U. of Pennsylvania. E-mail: chatain@wharton.upenn.edu. I thank
the Editor, two anonymous referees, Tunji Adegbesan, Christian Asmussen, Matthew Bidwell, Laurence Capron, Raj
Choudhury, Gary Dushnitsky, Kathy Eisenhardt, Emilie Feldman, Javier Gimeno, Rahul Kapoor, Felipe Monteiro, Evan
Rawley, Francisco Ruiz-Aliseda, Metin Sengul and Peter Zemsky as well as participants to the 2011 CRES conference,
the 2012 Atlanta Competitive Advantage Conference, the 2012 Strategy Research Forum, the 2012 Duke Strategy
Conference, and the Wharton Management Department Brownbag Seminar for comments on previous versions of this
paper.
INTRODUCTION
Strategy scholars have studied strategic factor markets to understand when resource buyers could
make an economic profit (Barney, 1986). In particular, scholars have made great strides studying
the role of differences in information about returns (Makadok, 2001; Makadok and Barney, 2001;
Denrell, Fang and Winter, 2003; Maritan and Florence, 2008; Ross, 2012) and of buyer-resources
synergies (Barney, 1988; Adegbesan, 2009).
Extant formal research has made two implicit assumptions. First, those works assume that re-
source sellers are taking no action besides showing up to the market. We know little about what
sellers do to improve their position before the factor market opens and the implications of these
actions. In this paper, I will focus on one important type of action that sellers can take: the de-
velopment of resources before their sale in the factor market. Prior research has taken the quality
of resources sold in the factor market as given. I relax that assumption in this paper by studying
resource development by firms active on the supply side of the factor market.
The second implicit assumption is that buyers of resources are not competitors in the product
market. With the exception of Asmussen (2010), extant works model factor markets as if buyers of
resource were using resources to collect an abstract stream of revenues rather than actually deploying
the resource in a competitive product market where competitors are also buyers of resources. This
matters because competitive conditions in the product market ultimately determine the returns to the
deployment of resources (Grahovac and Miller, 2009; Asmussen, 2010; Costa, Cool and Dierickx,
2012). Moreover, if buyers are also competitors in the product markets they may attempt to preempt
resources to deny them to their competitor. All this directly bears on how much a buyer will want
to pay for a resource (and resource quality). Yet we know very little about how resource-based
competition in product markets shapes factor markets. In this paper, I will explicitly derive the value
of resources in the factor market in relationship to their effect on profits in the product market.
I use a formal model where sellers of resources develop resources before selling them in the
factor market and where buyers deploy the resources to compete in a product market. With this
model, I can explore how competition between resource buyers in the product market drives resource
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development by resource sellers.
My results offer several insights into the role of competition in factor markets at both the seller
level and buyer level. First, I find that resource prices in the factor market depend on both their use
value and their preemption value, i.e., the value of denying a competitor access to a resource in the
product market. Because of this, returns to resource development are higher in an industry where
resources are sold before they are developed compared to an industry where resource development
is integrated with resource deployment. Resource sellers adjust their development efforts to both
the use and the preemption value of the resource they sale. By contrast, in an industry where devel-
opment is integrated, firms only care about the use value of the resource they develop because their
own resource development effort does not deprive their competitor from the opportunity to develop
a resource.
Second, I find that resource combination, whether additive (resource qualities add up) or exclu-
sive (only the quality of the better resources matter), determines the type of development equilib-
rium. If combination is additive, sellers develop resources at similar levels. However, if combination
is exclusive (only the best resource matters), I find that one seller develops at a high level whereas
the other develops at a low level. Thus resources become heterogeneous even though there are
no initial differences among firms. This contributes to the stream of papers explaining resource
development heterogeneity as the result of strategic interactions (Ruiz-Aliseda and Zemsky, 2006;
Chatain and Zemsky, 2011), thus exploring how “firm heterogeneity is an endogenous creation of
economic actors” (Mahoney and Pandian, 1992: 374) in an equilibrium setting.
Finally, in analyzing how the intensity of rivalry in the product market influences resource sell-
ers’ development decisions, I find that greater rivalry increases the preemption value of the resources
and increases further the wedge between investment incentives in industries with strategic factor
markets compared to industries where development is integrated with deployment. Because of this,
greater rivalry in the product market causes specialized resource sellers to develop resources above
and beyond what integrated firms would themselves do.
The paper proceeds as follows. The following section discusses the main features of strategic
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factor markets and related literatures. I follow with the description of the model. I then examine
equilibrium resource development in two scenarios: development before sale, and sale (exclusive
contracting) before development. Finally, I focus on the impact of rivalry in the product market on
resource development. All proofs are in an appendix.
STRATEGIC FACTOR MARKETS AND INTERNAL RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT
Resource development possibilities at the firm and industry levels
Strategic factor markets are where “firms buy and sell the resources necessary to implement their
strategies (Hirshleifer, 1980)” (Barney, 1986: 1232). A leading reason why firms might buy re-
sources in factor markets is that they can find in these markets the resources that they need to com-
pete but that they cannot develop internally (Capron and Mitchell, 2009). The external acquisition
of capabilities is thus an important aspect of a resource-based strategy for firms that find themselves
constrained in terms of development.
Penrose’s (1959) analysis of the growth of firms offers two reasons why firms may find the
development of new resources and capabilities difficult (Kor and Mahoney, 2000). First, resource
development, and innovation, depend on idiosyncratic knowledge that is distributed heterogeneously
across firms (Penrose, 1959:25), and difficult to transmit across firm boundaries (Kogut and Zander,
1992). As a consequence, each firm within an industry will have access to only a subset of the
resource development opportunities that the industry as a whole can exploit. Second, firms may
be constrained by a limited amount of slack managerial services or experience needed to guide the
process of resource development (Kor and Mahoney, 2005). Without enough of these services they
cannot develop new resources and capabilities.
The constraints placed on the internal development of resources are an essential motivation for
the external acquisition of resources, especially those of technological nature (e.g., Chaudhuri and
Tabrizi, 1999; Graebner, 2004; Ranft and Lord, 2002). As argued in those works, firms such as
Cisco, Intel and Microsoft use strategic factor markets to procure the resources and knowledge they
cannot generate themselves. For similar reasons, Google, Facebook and Yahoo have also been re-
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cently regular acquirers of external resources.1 Overall, this stream of research suggests that the
external acquisition of resources is an essential tool to renew and expand a resource base that con-
straints future development (Capron and Mitchell, 2009).
The external acquisition of resource allows breaking from the limitations of internal development
by allowing the procurement of more resources than can be developed internally. Moreover, absent
antitrust restrictions, firms can acquire multiple resources, as long as they are willing to offer the
highest price to the seller.2 Accordingly, the model does not restrict resource buyers’ ability to bid
(and possibly win) for the resources available on the market as long as the bids are rational given the
actions of competitors.
External acquisition is possible if there are indeed other resources to be acquired. Multiple
resource development opportunities will exist within an industry if, for instance, the underlying
technologies used allow for various product and process innovation. This will be the case in R&D
intensive industries, as well as industries where customers have heterogeneous tastes allowing for
the development of differentiated brands.
In these industries the supply side of strategic factor markets can be very active. For instance
venture capitalists who back technological startups often do not intend to remain shareholders for
the long run. Their preferred exit strategy is to sell the firm and its resources to a strategic buyer.
Summing up, it is assumed throughout the paper that firms cannot develop more than one new
resource or capability at a time due to constraints on the capacity of managerial services or to limited
access to relevant knowledge. However, it will be assumed that there are two such opportunities
available in the industry considered as a whole and that strategic factor markets allow firms to break
from internal resource development constraints. Table 1 summarizes these arguments and provides
further illustrations.
1For example, Google made more than 100 acquisitions between 2001 and 2011. Yahoo made more than 60 acqui-
sitions between 1997 and 2011. Facebook representatives announced in August 2011 a plan to make 20 acquisitions
in 2011. Source: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-08-23/facebook-steps-up-acquisitions-to-add-users-as-google-
rivalry-grows-tech.html. Retrieved October 22, 2012.
2A similar assumption is made in models of strategic interactions in input markets where one bidder can potentially
buy the entire supply of inputs (Stalh, 1988)
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Table 1: Summary and illustration of assumptions on resource development at levels of firms and
industry
Assumption Mechanisms Illustrations
Multiple resources can be
developed within the industry
• Formal assumption: two
resources are developed in
the industry
Multiple paths available to develop
resources able to improve products
and processes
Industries with continuous product
innovation (e.g., biotech, IT,
mobile computing); Industries with
a variety of consumer preferences
(e.g., consumer goods); Industries
where process innovations of
different nature are possible (e.g.,
integrated vs. minimills in
steelmaking)
A given firm can develop fewer
resources than the industry as a
whole
• Formal assumption: a firm
(specialized resource
developer or firm integrating
resource development with
deployment) cannot develop
more than one resource at a
time
Impactedness of relevant
knowledge due to path dependence
of firm-specific managerial services
restricts and orients development
possibilities (Penrose, 1959)
A traditional camera company
specialized in high quality optics
will find development of own
electronics sensors impossible,
while a consumer electronics firm
selling camera will find own
development of high quality optics
impossible, yet both types of
innovations are relevant for the
industry (e.g., Leica vs. Panasonic)
Lack of slack in managerial
services precludes development of
multiple resources (Kor and
Mahoney, 2005; Penrose, 1959)
A firm with brand development
capabilities cannot develop
multiple new brands at the same
time due to lack of managerial
slack (e.g., Tod’s S.p.A. sequential
acquisition and development of
luxury shoe brands)
A firm can relax internal
constraints on resource
development by buying resources
already developed on a strategic
factor market (or contract in such
market to access new resource
development capabilities)
• Formal assumption: A firm
can attempt to buy multiple
resources (no restriction on
bidding)
Firms seek to acquire in strategic
factor markets the resources they
need to compete but cannot
develop on their own (Chaudhuri
and Tabrizi, 1999; Graebner, 2004;
Ranft and Lord, 2002)
Sellers of resources seek the
highest price for their resources.
No external limitations (e.g.,
antitrust) to the acquisition of
multiple resources (e.g., resource
acquisition does foreclose
competitors from the product
market)
Pharmaceutical firms (e.g.,
AstaZeneca, Merck, Pfizer, Roche)
acquiring multiple smaller,
VC-backed, biotechnology firms to
fill gaps in their product offering
and to compensate for
disappointing internal
development
Technological acquisitions in
technology markets (e.g., Cisco,
Intel, Google, Microsoft, Apple,
Facebook) to expand competence
base and product portfolio into new
areas that cannot be reached
through internal development6
Constraints on resource combination and integration
While resource acquisition is a matter of bidding higher than the competition, resource integration,
and thus combination, requires the use of internal managerial services to attend to the integration
process (Penrose, 1959). This process is far from simple, as made clear by the technology acquisition
integration literature (e.g., Ranft and Lord, 2002; Puranam, Singh and Chaudhuri, 2009).
I will explore two polar cases for the combination of resources: additive combination and ex-
clusive combination. In the additive case, the combination of two resources of respective qualities
R1 and R2 is equivalent to a resource of quality R1 + R2. In the exclusive case, the combination of
two resources of qualities R1 and R2 creates a resource whose quality is the maximum of R1 and
R2. The additive case is intuitive: it describes the case when using one resource does not affect the
other. The exclusive case requires more elaboration.
A good source of insights for resource combination is the literature on post-merger integration. A
merger between two firms is the logical equivalent of combining two sets of resources to create a new
one and the M&A market is a leading example of a factor market (Barney 1986, 1988). Therefore,
what happens when two firms merge can give us insights on the outcome of the combination of two
resources.
This literature emphasizes that integrating relatively similar factors of production can be difficult.
Case studies of actual attempts to combine capabilities have shown that it was sometimes preferable
to pick the better of two available capabilities and abandon the other. For instance, managers of
the combined HP and Compaq entity adopted the policy of picking the best resource or capability
available in either firm without attempting to combine them (Burgelman and Meza, 2004). Similarly,
Cassiman, Columbo, Gerrone and Veugelers (2005) find that firms combining comparable R&D
resources were likely to decide on cuts and shut downs (as in the case of R&D capabilities ) if
resources proved redundant. These examples suggest that sometimes the best way to combine two
resources is to simply use the better one and abandon the other.
Firms will use exclusively the better resource if the marginal contribution of the lower quality
resource is zero. This may happen when the resources that are deployed are indivisible and “scale-
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free”, in the sense that their opportunity cost of deployment is zero (Levinthal and Wu, 2010). If
both resources are going to supply the same service to the firm, but the best resource can be deployed
wherever the worse resource needs to be deployed, then the best policy is to deploy only the better
resource. Similarly, when the marginal contribution of a lower quality resource is positive, but is
still less than the recurring cost of maintaining the resource, it is best to only use the better resource.
Finally, the exclusive case can be seen as the outcome of limited integration capabilities in the
buying firms. The limited availability of managerial services that restricts resource development can
also, to a lesser extent, hinder resource integration, leading a firm to concentrate on the better of two
resources at hand.
Table 2 presents examples and rationales for the exclusive case. For instance, Procter & Gamble
decided to terminate a brand of toilet paper it owned (White Cloud) and to only keep the Charmin
brand. Presumably, the White Cloud brand was still valuable, but the incremental cost of maintaining
and managing it was less than the incremental benefit it could provide. Accordingly, I will contrast
development strategies in the exclusive combination case with those in the additive case.
Rivalry in the product market and the demand for strategic factors
This paper incorporates product markets in the analysis of factor markets and focuses on the role
of competition, understood as level of rivalry, between resource buyers. This builds on the idea
that resource buyers are willing to pay for resources in function of the value these resources allow
capturing in the product market (Priem and Butler, 2001; Peteraf and Barney, 2003).
Analyzing product market competition is most relevant when resource buyers are in an inter-
mediary situation between being a monopolist in its product markets and a small participant in a
perfectly competitive market. If the buyer is a monopolist in its own market, the benefit it can ac-
crue from deploying a resource does not depend on competition there, as there is no competition to
start with. The same is true if the resource buyer is active in a perfectly competitive product market.
Because all firms have a negligible impact on the market price, any acquisition of resource will have
a negligible effect on other firms.
Accordingly, I focus on a product market where the number of firms is small. For analytical
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Table 2: Exclusive outcomes in resource combination (Value of combined resource is max(R1, R2))
Mechanism Examples
Resources cannot be
deployed
simultaneously
Incompatible technologies
• RISC vs CISC
• Standard for IT infrastructure (SAP vs. Oracle)
• Two different designs for accelerometers to be used in a cell phone
Incompatible organizational principles
• Improvement to production for assembly line and unskilled workers vs.
improvement to production for cell production and skilled workers
Deploying both
resources is possible
but not economical
The marginal contribution of using the second resource is zero or less than the
cost of deployment
• Two molecules with similar pharmaceutical functions (e.g., two bron-
chodilators: formoterol vs. salmeterol)
• Two brands targeting different customer segments. The contribution of
each is more than the recurring cost of maintaining the brand through ad-
vertising (e.g., Charmin and White Cloud brands for Procter & Gamble)
tractability, I assume two potential buyers who are competing against each other in a product market.
Moreover, I will seek to make the analyses robust across a wide range of models of product market
competition by relying on assumptions shared by many of these models.
Related literatures
Other streams of research have explicitly studied the relationship between competition in the product
market and outcomes in various markets for inputs. What answers can they provide to strategy
scholars interested in factor markets, investment in resources, and product market competition?
The market intermediation literature (e.g., Stahl, 1988) focuses on whether prices deviate from
a standard supply and demand outcome, but has little to say on the investment incentives of input
producers. In these models, firms act as intermediaries between producers and consumers, and want
to bid up the supply to become a monopolist. This typically results in high prices on both the input
and the product market but zero profits for the intermediaries. While the tendency to preempt the
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input is also at play in my model, the goal of preemption is not in itself to limit quantities in the
product market but rather to reduce the relative efficiency of a competitor.
In the production outsourcing literature (e.g., Gupta and Loulou, 1998; Cachon and Harker,
2004; Gilbert, Xia and Yu, 2006), firms competing in the product market face excessive incentives
to reduce their costs, leading to deleterious competition. They can improve their lot by outsourcing
production and cost reduction to an upstream supplier. In these papers, firms buy components of the
final product, and returns from investments are proportional to the quantity sold. Double marginal-
ization will keep prices high, reduce the quantity sold, and reduce the investment incentives of the
supplier, which makes the buying firms better off. This mechanism is markedly different from what
I study in this paper. In this paper sellers build indivisible resources, such as a technology or any
another knowledge asset that improves the profit functions of the resource buyers. All that matters
is resource quality. As a result, double marginalization does not play a role because resources are
traded as a whole prior to product market competition.
The relationship between product and strategic factor markets relates closely to contributions
made by the literature on markets for innovation. This literature typically asks whether innovators
are better off licensing an innovation to incumbents or entering the product market to exploit it
themselves (Arora and Fosfuri, 2003). It has, for instance, found that if markets for innovation are
not functioning well, innovators will more often enter the product market, strengthening competition
there (Gans and Stern, 2000). Authors have also argued that competition in the product market
could be leveraged by sellers of innovation to protect them from opportunistic behavior by buyers
(Anton and Yao, 1994), alleviating informational frictions in the market for innovation. However, the
works that have explored differential incentives for investment among actors have usually contrasted
entrants and incumbents in the product market (Arrow, 1962) rather than directly comparing sellers
and users of strategic factors. This sheds less light on how preexisting conditions in the product
market among resource buyers affect resource sellers’ incentives to develop better resources.
Finally, the literatures on vertical foreclosure (Rey and Tirole, 2007; Gabszewicz and Zanaj,
2008) and on raising rivals’ costs (Salop and Scheffman, 1983) focuses on how preemptive actions
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in a market for an intermediary good can affect competition in the product market. However, re-
search in these streams typically does not endogenize the investment incentives of the sellers of
intermediary goods. In contrast, the model presented in this paper includes actions by sellers of
intermediary goods (here, strategic resources) and studies in details their investment incentives.
MODEL SETUP AND FORMAL ASSUMPTIONS
The model is deliberately developed to be relevant under a wide range of classic models of prod-
uct market competition. This approach helps to broaden the domain of validity of the model and
eliminates the need for ancillary assumptions that may make analysis more cumbersome and less
transparent.
The model comprises two resource buyers denoted by Bi, i ∈ {1, 2} that compete in a product
market and two resource sellers denoted by Si, i ∈ {1, 2}. Resource sellers each develop and sell
one resource to resource buyers. Table 3 brings together the main symbols and notations used in the
paper and shows when they are used.
Resource development technology
Resource sellers have access to a technology that enables them to develop one resource at a cost that
increases with the quality of the resource. Let C(x) be the cost of developing a resource of quality
x. Assume the function C(x) is twice continuously differentiable such that:
C(0) = 0,
∂C(x)
∂x
> 0,
∂2C(x)
∂x2
> 0, x ≥ 0.
With this technology, seller Si develops a resource to quality level Ri for a cost C(Ri) and sells it
on the factor market.
Assumptions on resource integration
Because factor market competition may result in a buyer buying the two resources that are put to sale,
we need to specify how resources combine. Following our discussion of the outcomes of resource
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Table 3: Notation
Construct Symbol
Baseline elements
Cost of developing resource to quality level x C(x)
Combined quality of resources of individual quality x and y g(x, y)
Buyer Bi’s product market profits, for resource quality x and competitor’s resource quality y: ΠBi (x, y)
Resource development level (quality) decided by seller Si Ri
Bid offered by buyer Bi for resource sold by seller Sj bij
Seller’s Si revenues given Ri and R−i pi(Ri, R−i)
Seller’s Si profit ΠSi
Integrated firm Bi’s profit net of resource development cost Π
B
i (Ri, R−i))
Equilibrium values of resource development level
Development when resources are monopolized by one buyer
Symmetric development by sellers with additive resources RAdditive
Asymmetric development by sellers with exclusive resources RH , RL
Symmetric development by firms integrating development and deployment RID
Development when resources are not monopolized by one buyer
Symmetric development by sellers with additive resources RAdd∗
Asymmetric development by sellers with exclusive resources RH∗, RL∗
Development when development is contracted upon ex ante
Symmetric development by sellers with additive resources RAdd∗∗
Asymmetric development by sellers with exclusive resources RH∗∗, RL∗∗
Effect of changes in rivalry in the product market on equilibrium development
Parameter shifting the level of rivalry in the product market θ
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combination, I make the following formal assumptions. Combining two resources of respective
qualities x and y provides a benefit g(x, y).
g(x, y) =

x+ y when resource combination is additive
max(x, y) when resource combination is exclusive
Assumptions on product market competition
Once resources are transferred to the buyers and integrated, product market competition unfolds.
The buyers’ profits depend on the level of development of resources (i.e., the quality level of re-
sources) and their allocation across buyers. The following notation uses generalized functions to
represent profits in the product market and to account for the quality of resources and their alloca-
tion across competitors. The profit of a resource buyer before any payment to a resource seller is
written ΠBi (x, y) where the first variable of the function (x) is the quality of the resource (or the
combination of resources) owned by buyer Bi and the second variable (y) is the quality of the re-
source or combination of resources owned by its rival B−i. I will assume that these functions are
identical across buyers and I will drop the buyer index accordingly.
I assume that the function ΠB is twice continuously differentiable in its arguments. Moreover, I
assume:
∂ΠB(x, y)
∂x
> 0,
∂ΠB(x, y)
∂y
< 0,
∂2ΠB(x, y)
∂x∂y
≤ 0.
The first assumption means that a firm’s profit increases when it deploys a resource of higher
quality. The second means that a firm’s profits decrease when a competitor uses better resources. The
third assumption means that the effect of a firm’s resource decreases when the competitor’s resource
improves (i.e., resource qualities are strategic substitutes). Furthermore, I assume that ΠB(x, y) is
weakly convex in its second argument. This is consistent with the idea that as a competitor becomes
better, a focal firm’s profitability is less and less affected because it is reaching a floor.
These assumptions cover many workhorse models of competition in the product market. In par-
ticular, the assumption that resource levels are strategic substitutes is verified when resources reduce
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cost or improve quality in many classic models of oligopolistic competition (Amir and Wooders,
2000; Athey and Schmutzler, 2001). These include Cournot and differentiated Bertrand with linear
demand and linear costs, horizontal competition with quadratic costs and two firms. On the basis of
these assumptions the analyses below will be valid across a wide spectrum of models.
Resource quality levels, however, can also be strategic complements in some important situa-
tions. Think for instance of resources that increase the size of the market by drawing new customers
rather than by stealing customers from the competitor, or when investing in a resource is a make-or-
break effort to avoid bankruptcy. The framework of this paper could be adapted in a straightforward
manner to accommodate these cases.
Resource development by sellers to the factor market and integrated development benchmark
The main model will analyze resource development strategies when resources are developed inde-
pendently by sellers prior to the sale. This portrays well the market for the ownership of startups,
when owners of startups have already developed capabilities and resources and are acquired by
larger companies that will integrate them in their operations.
The left panel of Figure 1 depicts the base model while an important benchmark model is de-
picted on the right panel. In the base model of development for strategic factor market resources are
developed by sellers that are separate from the buyers. There is rivalry in development (developers
face a competitor) and in deployment of resources (both buyers are competing in a product market).
Resources are allocated to firms competing in the product market thanks to the operation of a factor
market.
In the benchmark model we make the thought experiment of removing the strategic factor market
while keeping every other initial condition similar. Resource development is now integrated with
resource deployment and product market activities. Similarly to the base model, there is rivalry for
development and for the deployment of resources. The number of resources to be developed in the
industry is also the same. The comparison of the outcomes of the benchmark model to the base
model answers the following question: “How does the existence of a strategic factor market in an
industry affects resource development patterns under rivalry compared to an industry where there is
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Integrated Resource Development 
(Benchmark) 
• Resources are developed for and exchanged 
on a factor market 
• Rivalry in resource development 
• Rivalry in the product market 
• Resources development is integrated with 
deployment (no factor market) 
• Rivalry in resource development 
• Rivalry in the product market 
 Development for Strategic Factor 
Market (Main model) 
Firm boundaries S1 
Resource 
development activities B1 
Resource deployment and 
product market activities 
S1 S2 
B1 B2 
Product 
market 
S1 S2 
B1 B2 
Product 
market 
Strategic Factor Market 
Figure 1: Overview of the main model and of the integrated resource development benchmark
no strategic factor market?” Any difference in outcome between the base model and the benchmark
can be attributed to the difference in initial conditions.
Sellers develop resources independently and non-cooperatively before selling them in auctions
that are held simultaneously. Previous work has used auctions to model factor markets (Makadok,
2001; Maritan and Florence, 2008), which describes well markets where sellers set out to generate
competition among buyers, as is often the case in factor markets.3
The time line of the game is as follows:
1. Resource development: Sellers invest to develop a resource at a certain quality level giving
3An alternative is to use a cooperative game approach (e.g., Lippman and Rumelt, 2003; Adegbesan, 2009) embed-
ded in a biform approach (Brandenburger and Stuart, 2007). The drawback of such approach is that the core of the
cooperative game may fail to exist when buyers interact after resources are allocated (Jehiel and Moldovanu, 1996).
15
resources R1 and R2.
2. Factor market competition: Sellers set simultaneous second price auctions to sell their re-
sources. Sellers transfer the ownership of the resource to the highest bidder and collect rev-
enues.
3. (If necessary.) Resource integration: If a buyer bought resources R1 and R2, it combines
them into a new resource of quality g(R1, R2).
4. Product market competition: Buyers compete with each other in the product market. Their
profits are affected by the quality of the resources they own and by the quality of the resources
their competitor owns.
In the model all players are forward looking and anticipate what will happen in the next stages of
the game. Resource buyers bid in the auction anticipating what will happen in the product market.
Resource sellers make investment decisions anticipating the equilibrium bids in the factor market.
I solve the model by backward induction. I first solve the model in the factor market (stage 2
above) before turning to the optimal resource development (stage 1). Note that the outcome of
product market competition given resource allocation and quality levels (stages 3 and 4) is already
summarized by the profit function ΠB.
FACTOR MARKET COMPETITION (STAGE 2)
Assumptions on the factor market
The factor market consists of two simultaneous second-price sealed-bid auctions. Neither sellers nor
buyers coordinate their actions. Buyers simultaneously submit bids to each seller. Each seller sells
the resource to the highest bidder for the resource it controls, and does not coordinate with the other
bidder. If the bids for the same resource are identical, the seller randomly picks a winner, with each
buyer winning with strictly positive probability.
Resources are not sold as a bundle, reflecting the assumption that sellers are not cooperating,
even though buyers may want to combine resources. This protocol is rather conservative with respect
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to seller revenues. In an auction, by definition, sellers cannot name their price, which creates a
ceiling on how much value they will be able to extract. Moreover, the auctions are simultaneous,
which means that buyers can play each seller against the other.4
Buyers will submit bids for a resource given their expectations about who will acquire the other
resources. As these are second price auctions, a buyer’s dominant strategy is to submit a bid equal
to the maximum amount it is willing to pay for the resource. In order to determine bids, we have
to keep in mind that a firm’s optimal bid for a resource is the difference between its profits in the
product market if it owns the resource and those profits if its competitor owns the resource instead
(Jehiel and Moldovanu, 1996).
Bids will form an equilibrium when the final ownership of resources given the bids is consistent
with the expectations under which the bids were formed. The method to characterize equilibria is to
assume a particular allocation of resources after the auction (e.g., one buyer gets both resources, or
each buyer gets one resource), find the optimal bids given the anticipated allocation, and then check
if the optimal bids indeed lead to the assumed outcome.
Numerical example
To make these ideas concrete, we start with a numerical example. Assume the following product
market profits given the ownership of resources:
Profit with R1 and R2 = ΠB(g(R1, R2), 0)) = 11, Profit with only R2 = ΠB(R2, R1) = 3,
Profit with only R1 = ΠB(R1, R2) = 4, Profit with no resources = ΠB(0, g(R1, R2)) = 1.
4The simultaneity of the auctions reflects the idea that both sellers have similar incentives to be first to sell their
resource and that a contest to be first would result in a draw. An alternative would be to have resources sold sequen-
tially, with one seller selling its resource first. Appendix B explores such a model where the order of sale is randomly
determined. I thank an anonymous referee for suggesting to explore this alternative.
17
The incremental value of owning a second resource while controlling the other is more than that of
owning one resource versus none. For example:
ΠB(g(R1, R2), 0))− ΠB(R1, R2) = 11− 4 = 7,
ΠB(R2, R1)− ΠB(0, g(R1, R2)) = 3− 1 = 2.
To determine equilibrium prices, we need to make an assumption regarding the eventual allocation
of the resources, determine the prices that follow from the assumption, and check that these prices
verify the assumption.
We will see below that valuations like these imply that one buyer will acquire both resources at
equilibrium. Assume thus that one buyer (B1, without loss of generality) anticipates winning the
resources in both auctions. In a second price auction buyers bid the maximum price they are willing
to pay for a resource, as this is a dominant strategy. Buyer B1’s bids will be the following:
B1’s Bid for R1 = Profit with R1 and R2 − Profit with only R2 = 11− 3 = 8
B1’s Bid for R2 = Profit with R1 and R2 − Profit with only R1 = 11− 4 = 7.
Notice that the sum of the bids is more than the value of owning both resources. This is because
each bid is equal to buyer B1’s willingness to pay for a resource conditional on its winning the other
resource.
In an equilibrium, buyer B2 correctly anticipates it will not win either resource. Its bids are
equals to its willingness to pay for each resource conditional on not winning the other resource.
B2’s Bid for R1 = Profit with only R1 − Profit with no resource = 4− 1 = 3,
B2’s Bid for R2 = Profit with only R2 − Profit with no resource = 3− 1 = 2.
We see that buyer B1 always bids higher than buyer B2. Accordingly, it receives the two re-
sources, which is what we assumed initially. As a result, these four bids form an equilibrium. This
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can be confirmed by looking at potential deviations by each player, holding the other player’s bids
constant, and checking that the deviations do not allow for strictly superior profits.
Neither buyer B1 nor buyer B2 can make strictly more money by bidding less. In the case of
buyer B1, it could actually lose the resources by bidding too low, while buyer B2 is indifferent,
knowing it will not win anyway.
Buyer B1 cannot make strictly more money by bidding more, as any bid would exceed its
willingness-to-pay in the most favorable scenario. Is it possible, however, that buyer B2 submits
higher bids? The answer is no. Doing so would be irrational given it anticipates not winning both
resources. Its bid would exceed whatever additional profits it can expect to earn thanks to the re-
source.
Moreover, in an equilibrium, both buyers cannot bid as if they both anticipated getting the two
resources. To see this, suppose that both buyers anticipate winning both resources. In that case, given
their beliefs, they would both bid 8 for resource R1 and 7 for resource R2, leading to a tie. But in a
tie, the winner is randomly and independently determined. With these bids, a buyer is losing money
in expectation because there is a strictly positive probability that it wins both resources, paying 8 +
7 = 13 for resources that are worth only 11, netting a profit of −2. A buyer would also overpay if
it obtained only one resource, as its bid was made anticipating that it would get both resources. For
instance, it would pay 8 for resource R1 while the value of owning it is only 2 when resource R2 is
not owned at the same time.
Because of this, if both buyers bid high, each buyer is better off deviating and bidding less in
order to lose the auction for both resources, ensuring it gets 1, the profit without any resources. But
then, if a buyer anticipates losing, its optimal bids for R1 and R2 are respectively 3 and 2, so this
buyer’s bids (and the final prices in the auctions) go back to the equilibrium described above.
The auction concludes with the highest bid for resource R1 at 8, and the second highest at 2.
Thus the seller of resource R1 receives 2. Similarly, the highest bid for resource R2 is 7, and the
second-highest bid is 3. The seller of resource R2 receives 3.
Modeling the auctions as first price auction with a smallest monetary increment (e.g., one cent)
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would generate similar revenues, plus or minus a unit of monetary increment.5
Formal characterization of the equilibrium in the factor market
To understand investment incentives by sellers, we need to determine the prices at which the re-
sources will be sold in the factor market. These prices depend on buyer’s valuations, which in turn
depend on the eventual allocation of resources across buyers. Thus, we will need to formally deter-
mine the conditions under which resources are bought by the same buyer or by different buyers. To
do so, the procedure is to assume a specific outcome to the factor market and derive the conditions
under which it is actually an equilibrium.
We analyze first the outcome in which one buyer gets both resources. As seen above, if both
resources 1 and 2 are expected to be acquired by buyer B1 at equilibrium, then buyer B2’s bid for
resource 1 will reflect that it does not expect to get resource R2 and its bid for resource R2 will
reflect that it does not expect to get resource R1. Conversely, buyer B1’s bids for each resource will
reflect the expectation that it will also acquire the other.
In the case of resources of respective qualities R1 and R2 we would see the following bids in
the anticipation that buyer B1 will ultimately acquire both resources. Let bij be the bid that buyer Bi
submits for resource Rj . Starting with buyer B1’s bids, we have:
b11 = Π
B(g(R1, R2), 0)− ΠB(R2, R1), b12 = ΠB(g(R1, R2), 0)− ΠB(R1, R2).
The bid for resource 1 (b11) is the difference between buyer B1’s product market profits if it
owned the resource (ΠB(g(R1, R2), 0)) and if it did not, assuming it is left with resource R2 only,
ΠB(R2, R1). The bids can be decomposed in two parts: the use value for the resource, which
reflects the increase in profits if the resource is deployed by the buyer, and the preemptive value
for the resource, which reflects the value of preventing the competing buyers from deploying the
resource. Formally, denoting ΠB(R2, 0) as the profits of buyer B1 in the situation where resource
5The second price format is strategically equivalent to an ascending auction (English auction) when there are two
buyers (Krishna, 2009: 133) and the smallest monetary increment would guarantee the existence of a pure strategy
equilibrium in the first price auction.
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R1 is not deployed, we have:
b11 = Π
B(g(R1, R2), 0)− ΠB(R2, 0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Use value for R1
+ ΠB(R2, 0)− ΠB(R2, R1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Preemption value for R1
.
The preemption value is always strictly positive if buyers are competing with each other in the
product market. The implication is that a key feature of bidding for resources in these circumstances
is the potential for overbidding, in the sense that buyers are compelled to bid above their use value
for the resource. This phenomenon was shown by Jehiel and Moldovanu (1996) in the context of
the auction for a single unit. Under similar expectations about the outcome of the auctions, the bids
by buyer B2 are:
b21 = Π
B(R1, R2)− ΠB(0, g(R1, R2)), b22 = ΠB(R1, R2)− ΠB(0, g(R1, R2)).
These bids also reflect use and preemption value. The status quo situation is that resource R2 goes
to buyer B1, implying profits of ΠB(0, R2) for buyer B2. Then:
b21 = Π
B(R1, R2)− ΠB(0, R2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Use value for R1
+ ΠB(0, R2)− ΠB(0, g(R1, R2))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Preemption value for R1
.
All the bids submitted by the buyers (b11, b
1
2, b
2
1, b
2
2) form an equilibrium if they lead to the expected
outcome whereby buyer B1 gets both resources. That is, if b11 > b
2
1 and b
1
2 > b
2
2. If these condi-
tions are not met the equilibrium cannot be one where one buyer gets both resources. Instead, the
equilibrium will be one where each buyer gets one resource.
A similar derivation starting from the assumption that resources are bought by different buyers
can easily be made. The above discussion is summarized and extended in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Given resource developments R1 and R2 the outcome of the factor market with si-
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multaneous second price auctions is characterized by the following inequality.
ΠB(g(R1, R2), 0) + Π
B(0, g(R1, R2)) > Π
B(R1, R2) + Π
B(R2, R1). (1)
 If inequality (1) holds, one buyer buys the two resources at equilibrium. In this case, there
are two equilibria: either buyer B1 or buyer B2 gets the two resources. The equilibrium price of
resource i is:
pi(Ri, R−i) = ΠB(Ri, R−i)− ΠB(0, g(Ri, R−i))
 If inequality (1) is reversed and holds strictly, then each buyer buys one resource. In this
case, there are two equilibria: either buyer B1 gets resource 1 and buyer B2 gets resource 2, or the
reverse. The equilibrium price of resource i is:
pi(Ri, R−i) = ΠB(g(Ri, R−i), 0)− ΠB(R−i, Ri)
 If both sides of inequality (1) are equal, then all of the above equilibria exist.
The interpretation of inequality (1) is intuitive. Preemption will happen when the sum of buyer
profits grows as they become more asymmetric in terms of resource endowment. This condition will
typically be satisfied in some workhorse models of product market competition (e.g., Cournot and
differentiated Bertrand). In these models, total industry profits are larger when firms are asymmetric.
The reason for this is that the more asymmetric firms are, the closer the product market is to being a
monopoly, which ensures the highest level of profits.
Another way to interpret inequality (1) is to rewrite it as:
ΠB(g(R1, R2), 0)− ΠB(R1, R2) > ΠB(R2, R1)− ΠB(0, g(R1, R2)). (2)
On the left hand side is the benefit of controlling resource j if a buyer already controls resource i,
and on the right hand side is the benefit of controlling resource j if the buyer initially controls no
resource. Thanks to this, we can further understand when buyers will only buy one resource.
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If resources are less than additive, the direct benefit of owning two resources is depressed. If
buyers have only little competitive impact on each other, for lack of market overlap, the benefit of
denying the resource to the other buyer is also reduced. The combination of these two effects may
make the willingness to pay for a second resource less than what a competitor would be ready to pay
for a first resource, making preemption impossible.
To see this, consider the polar case where the combination of resources is exclusive and there is
no market overlap between buyers. If profits are not affected by the other buyer’s resource ownership
we have: ΠB(x, y) = ΠB(x, 0). Assume R1 = R2 = R and let g(R1, R2) = max(R1, R2). The
left hand side of (1) can be rewritten ΠB(R, 0) + ΠB(0, 0), while the right hand side becomes
ΠB(R, 0) + ΠB(R, 0). But, by assumption, ΠB(R, 0) > ΠB(0, 0), so we have:
ΠB(R, 0) + ΠB(0, 0) < ΠB(R, 0) + ΠB(R, 0),
and thus inequality (1) is not satisfied.
Interpretation of the multiplicity of equilibria
Resource prices are always determinate at equilibrium. However, the identity of the eventual buyer
is not, as there are multiple equilibria in which buyer B1 and buyer B2 play symmetric roles. This
multiplicity arises because buyer B1 and buyer B2 are identical and value resources similarly. When
they compete for resources by bidding in the factor market, neither has an advantage over the other
and there is no way to determine within the model itself which buyer will prevail.
It is possible that the ex post economic profits of the buyers are not equalized by competition
when the factor market closes. For instance, in our numerical example, the winner of the two
resources enjoys a product market profit of 11 while paying 3 + 2 = 5 for the resources, netting a
profit of 6 whereas the other buyer enjoys profits of 1.
However, buyers’ profits ex ante are identical, as which equilibrium will happen is indetermi-
nate.6 This outcome is fully consistent with extant research in factor market theory. Absent asym-
6Even if buyers were playing mixed strategies, their expected profits would also be similar due to buyers’ identical
valuations of the resources.
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metries in valuation and information, buyers are on a similar footing and cannot expect to make
superior profits ex ante (Barney, 1986; Lippman and Rumelt, 2003). Only luck — in this case under
the guise of equilibrium multiplicity — will allow a buyer to make a superior profit ex post.
This situation is well understood in game theory: the factor market takes the form of a coordi-
nation game. Considerations outside of the game, such as a buyer’s reputation to be an aggressive
bidder, can make one equilibrium more “focal” (Schelling, 1960) and facilitate coordination. Of
course, any difference in profits ex ante due to the existence of a focal point should then be at-
tributed to a buyer’s attributes that support the existence of the focal point.7
INVESTMENT IN RESOURCE QUALITY (STAGE 1)
Resource sellers anticipate the revenues they will earn in the factor market based on the prices
given by Proposition 1. Knowing this, they non-cooperatively decide how much to invest in the
development of resources prior to their sale in the factor market.
Assume that resources are acquired by the same buyer (this will be relaxed later). The revenue
earned by seller Si from the sale of a resource with quality level Ri when the competing resource
has quality level R−i is pi(Ri, R−i) as defined in Proposition 1. With development cost C(Ri), the
seller’s profit function is then:
ΠSi (Ri) = pi(Ri, R−i)− C(Ri) = ΠB(Ri, R−i)− ΠB(0, g(Ri, R−i))− C(Ri). (3)
We will look for a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the factor market development game where
seller S1 and S2 are simultaneously developing resources and earning profits as defined in equation
(3). To characterize this equilibrium, we define a benchmark that is the outcome of the integrated
development game. In the integrated development game, there is no factor market but there are
two players who integrate resource development and product market activities and can develop a
resource at cost C(). The two integrated players decide simultaneously how much to develop their
resource. The integrated firms then use their newly developed resource to compete in the product
7I thank an anonymous referee for pushing for the clarification of these issues.
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market.
In this integrated development game, a buyer is clearly at a disadvantage if it does not develop a
resource as the other buyer will develop one anyway. The symmetric Nash equilibrium (RID, RID)
of the buyer development game always exists and the development levelRID will be our benchmark.
The Nash equilibria of the two games can be precisely compared because the two games are formally
related to each other (see, e.g., Topkis, 1998: 183). Notice that buyer i’s total profit given Buyer
−i’s resource development decision is:
Π
B
i (Ri, R−i) = Π
B(Ri, R−i)− C(Ri), (4)
and that expression (4) is very similar to expression (3).
Turning to the characterization of the Nash equilibria in resource development of the factor
market development game, we find:
Proposition 2  Assume that development by sellers occurs before the sales of resources and that
the outcome of the factor market is one buyer acquiring both resources. Then:
(i) A pure strategy Nash equilibrium in resource development always exists.
(ii) When resource combination is additive, there is a symmetric resource development equilib-
rium: R1 = R2 = RAdditive. When resource combination is exclusive, resource development is
in pure strategy is asymmetric. One seller develops at level RH and the other at level RL, with
RH > RL.
(iii) Relative development levels are as follows: RH > RID > RL and RAdditive > RID where
RID is the development level in the symmetric Nash equilibrium of the integrated development
game.
 Assume that the outcome of the factor market is each buyer acquiring one resource. If resource
combination is additive, we have symmetric resource development (R1 = R2 = RAdd∗). If resource
combination is exclusive, any PSNE is asymmetric and development levels are such thatRH∗ > RL∗.
Moreover, we have RH∗ > RID and, if f ∂2ΠB(x, y)/∂x2 ≥ 0, we also have RAdd∗ > RH∗ > RID.
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The first point of Proposition 2 is that an equilibrium in pure strategy always exists (this draws
on work by Amir, Garcia and Knauff (2010)). Next, the proposition emphasizes the dual effects on
development strategies of the value of preemption and of the combination on resources.
Consider first the case of additive resources. Because of the possibility of preemption, a seller
of resources always has a greater incentive to develop the resource than a buyer would. Looking at
equation (3), we see that developing a resourceRi increases revenues in two ways: by increasing the
use value (ΠB(Ri, R−i)) and by increasing the preemption value (−ΠB(0, g(Ri, R−i))). By contrast,
in the integrated development game, each buyer only considers the use value of the resource given
the other buyer’s development decision and does not account for the preemption value.
Resource development for sale in a factor market differs markedly from development for own
use. Seller development incentives are stronger because buyers bid up resource prices in the hope of
preventing resources to be used by their competitor in the product market. As a result, development
of resources by sellers in the factor market is always higher than development of resources by buyers
(RAdditive > RID).
Interestingly, the competitive level of development by buyers RID is already too high for their
own taste. They would be better off developing at a lower level in order to maximize their joint
revenues but they are locked in a prisoner’s dilemma whereby they develop too much.8
Under exclusive combination, the outcome is characterized by the asymmetry of resource devel-
opment equilibria.9 These asymmetric equilibria emerge because a better resource enjoys strictly
higher returns than a weaker one, which makes symmetric equilibria untenable.
Thus, resource sellers developing resources competitively can end up choosing different develop-
ment levels purely as a result of strategic interactions and not because of preexisting asymmetries.10
To understand the intuition behind the result, assume that both sellers chose a similar develop-
ment level. This cannot be an equilibrium because a seller choosing a slightly higher development
8This is because when they improve their own resource, they undermine their competitor’s efficiency (due to
∂2ΠB(R1, R2)/∂R1∂R2 < 0). However, in a Nash equilibrium, they to not account for this negative effect in their
decision making. Having resources developed by sellers in the factor market is only exacerbating this problem.
9There is also at least one mixed strategy equilibrium for seller development in this case.
10From a technical standpoint, a similar mechanism is operating in Amir and Wooders’s (1999, 2000) studies of
investment with one-way spillover.
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level will immediately enjoy a discrete boost in returns to development. Indeed, the seller’s marginal
return to development will comprise those from the preemption value (−ΠB(0,max(R1, R2) =
−ΠB(0, R1) > 0) in addition to the use value (ΠB(R1, R2)). Seller S1 would then increase its
profits by developing the resource even more, motivating the deviation.
In contrast, seller S2, now a laggard, only enjoys returns from the use value of its resource
because an inferior resource is not worth preempting when combination is exclusive. This effect
creates a wedge in development incentives between a leader and a laggard that will make the leader
increase its effort and the laggard decrease it. This effect will be compounded by the nature of
the strategic interactions between the sellers. Because resource levels are strategic substitutes, the
leader’s higher development levels are also reducing the development returns of the laggard.
As a result, the lower level of development RL is even less than the development level by buyers
(RID). This is because the seller developing at a lower level has similar incentives as a buyer, but
faces a much more aggressive competitor, which reduces further returns to development.
The last part of the proposition indicates that these results largely hold when the outcome of
the factor market is each buyer getting one resource (i.e., if inequality (1) is not satisfied). The
main qualification is that resource development by seller will be always more intense than in the
integrated development benchmark (RAdd∗ > RID) under the condition that the effect of resource
quality has increasing returns (∂2ΠB(x, y)/∂x2 ≥ 0). However, this condition is satisfied in most
models where resources allow for improvement of quality or reduction of cost, including those in
which our assumption that resources are strategic substitutes holds as well (Athey and Schmutzler,
2001).
ALTERNATIVE TIMING: CONTRACTING BEFORE RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT
While resources are often developed before being sold, this is not always the case. A market for
contract development of innovation has emerged in the past years. For instance, contract research
organizations such as Covance and ICON supply research and development services in the pharma-
ceutical industry and now make up a substantial part of R&D expenses in this industry. Similarly,
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Wipro provides extension development services for a range of high tech industries.
A key difference between these markets and those analyzed above is one of timing: develop-
ment occurs after a contract is concluded. How are our results affected by this change of assump-
tion? Should we expect similar distortions of investment incentives between resource sellers (or
contractors) and integrated resource developers?
To answer these questions, I modify the timing of the model and allow buyers to first bid for
the exclusive contracting of the development capability of each seller. Once the development ca-
pabilities are contracted upon, buyers decide on the development level and assume the costs of
development.11
Once a buyer has secured access to the development capabilities of a resource buyer, its optimal
resource development is not affected by the amount it paid upfront to the seller. This amount is
effectively sunk. Given this, we already know from Proposition 2 that the optimal level of resource
development is R∗ in this case. We now only need to consider the development policy in the case
where the outcome of the contracting stage is one buyer getting exclusivity from both sellers. Note
that this is equivalent to an alternative model where one firm could develop and use two resources
while the other could not develop any. The buyers’ problem is to find R1 and R2 that maximize the
following profit function:
ΠB(g(R1, R2), 0)− C(R1)− C(R2).
From this, it can be shown:
Proposition 3 Assume that development occurs after contracting and that the outcome of the con-
tracting stage is one buyer getting exclusive access to both resource development capabilities.
(i) When resource combination is additive, resource development is symmetric: R1 = R2 =
RAdd∗∗. Moreover, if ∂2ΠB(x, y)/∂x2 ≥ 0 then RAdd∗∗ ≥ RID. If, in addition, the absolute
value of ∂ΠB(0, y)/∂y is small relative to ∂ΠB(x, 0)/∂x , then RAdd∗∗ > RAdditive.
(ii) When resource combination is exclusive, resource development is asymmetric. One resource is
11I thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this extension.
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developed at level RH∗∗ and the other resource is not developed: RL∗∗ = 0. We have RH∗∗ >
RID. Moreover, if the absolute value of ∂ΠB(0, y)/∂y is small relative to ∂ΠB(x, 0)/∂x , then
RH∗∗ > RH .
When resources are additive, their combination is not a problem and the buyer develops them
symmetrically to equalize the marginal cost of development. If there are increasing returns to owning
a better resource (∂2ΠB(x, y)/∂x2 ≥ 0), it is necessarily the case that each individual resource is
developed at a higher level than RID. If this is true, the returns to development for each resource
individually is always at least as high, prompting higher equilibrium development.
There are two forces that influence the level of resource development in this extension. First,
returns to development are not undercut by the other seller’s resource development as in the base
model. This increases the relative returns to development after contract. Second, increasing de-
velopment level does not increase revenues through the preemption effect as in the base model.
Preemption occurred before development decisions are made and does not affect the development
decision. This reduces the relative returns to development after contract. When the preemption effect
is relatively weak in the baseline model (i.e., ∂ΠB(0, y)/∂y is small), the former force dominates
the latter and development after contract is higher overall.
Finally, we can precisely delineate under the conditions under which preemption of all resource
production capacity will arise.
Proposition 4 Assume that development occurs after contracting. The outcome of the contracting
stage is one buyer getting exclusive access to both resource development capabilities if and only if:
ΠB(2RAdd∗∗, 0) + ΠB(0, 2RAdd∗∗)− 2C(RAdd∗∗) > 2ΠB(RID, RID)− 2C(RID).
if resource combination is additive, or,
ΠB(2RH∗∗, 0) + ΠB(0, 2RH∗∗)− 2C(RH∗∗) > 2ΠB(RID, RID)− 2C(RID)
if resource combination is exclusive.
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As in Proposition 1, the monopolization of production capacity is more likely to happen when
industry profits are higher with monopolization of resources. The difference is that the cost of
development has to be factored in, as buyers include the cost of developing resource, which they
will have to bear, in their calculations.
RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT AND RIVALRY IN THE PRODUCT MARKET
We have seen above that the eventual allocation of resources (one buyer buying the two, or each
buyer getting one) was determined in part by the extent of competitive overlap of buyers in the prod-
uct market. There are, however, other dimensions to the competitive intensity of an industry. One
is the intensity of rivalry (Porter, 1980). Factors such as customer preferences, product differenti-
ation, the ability to connect firms and customers or to collude tacitly can make competition softer
or harsher. In this section I investigate how changes in level of rivalry in the product market affect
resource development by resource sellers. For conciseness, I restrict the analysis to the case where
one buyer ends up with both resources at the conclusion of the factor market competition.
To understand how changes in rivalry intensity affect investments to develop resources, we need
to make assumptions on the interaction effect of rivalry and resource quality on product market
profits (i.e., the cross partial derivative of ΠB with respect to rivalry and resource quality). Define
θ as a shifter of the intensity of rivalry in the product market where higher θ corresponds to higher
rivalry.
I make no a priori assumption on the sign of the cross partial of rivalry and own resource quality
on product market profits (i.e., the sign of ∂2ΠB(x, y, θ)/∂θ∂x can be positive or negative). While it
is commonly argued that competitors with better resources should welcome more rivalry (Makadok,
2010; Chatain and Zemsky, 2011), this view is incomplete. Indeed, it is possible for the interaction
effect of rivalry and resource quality to be negative even though deploying the resource is still
advantageous. This would happen, for instance, when competition in price (Bertrand) while product
differentiation is low.
Appendix B presents a numerical example set in a Bertrand differentiated duopoly where θ stands
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for the effect of a competitor’s price on a firm’s demand. If θ is low, then an increase of θ increases
the returns to a resource, while if θ is high, then a further increase in θ reduces the returns to the
resource. The intuition for this is as follows: in a Bertrand model deploying a resource that reduces
marginal cost makes a firm behave more aggressively. Under conditions of high rivalry, this will
trigger an aggressive response by the competitor, which undermines the positive effect of deploying
the resource.12
Finally, I assume that a higher θ makes a firm more vulnerable to a competitor’s resource:
∂2ΠB(x, y, θ)
∂θ∂y
< 0. (5)
Based on these assumptions (inequality (5)) we can unpack the effect of rivalry on equilibrium
development levels. I will make use of the following definitions:
Use value effect:
∂2ΠB(x, y, θ)
∂θ∂x
Preemption value effect: −∂
2ΠB(0, g(x, y), θ)
∂θ∂y
The use value effect is the interaction effect of rivalry (θ) and own resource level (x) on profits,
because it modifies the returns to deploying a resource for one’s own use. The preemption value
effect is the opposite of the interaction effect of rivalry (θ) and competitor’s resource level (y), which
is the effect of rivalry on the preemption value of a resource. With these definitions, we can study
the effect of changes of θ on equilibrium investment behavior.
Proposition 5 Assume that the outcome of the sales is one buyer acquiring both resources and
consider the effect of small changes in rivalry (parameter θ) on equilibrium development levels,
starting from θ0. If resource combination is additive:
1. ∂RAdditive/∂θ > 0 when the sum of the interaction effects of rivalry and resource development
on use value and on preemption value is positive.
12This is consistent with the results offered by Almeida Costa, Cool and Dierickx (2012). They show that when
competition is on price, and rivalry is very high, deploying a value-enhancing resource can even have a negative effect
on the profits of the firm deploying the resource because of the escalation of rivalry in the product market.
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2. A change in rivalry parameter can have opposite effects on equilibrium development levels if
development is by sellers before the sale rather than by buyers or by sellers after a contract.
This is the case when the interaction effect of rivalry and resource development on use value
is negative while the total effect on use and preemption value is positive.
The first point of the proposition implies that more rivalry will entail more resource development
by sellers unless there is a strong negative interaction effect of rivalry and own resource levels on
product market profits. Indeed, given that ∂2ΠB(x, y, θ)/∂θ∂y < 0), by assumption it takes a very
negative interaction effect on the use value to decrease the returns to resource development. This
confirms the impression that competition in the product market tends to be bad for resource buyers.
More rivalry is simply making the preemption value of resources higher, implying that resource
sellers will develop more than what resource buyers would.
This is confirmed by the second point of the proposition. In fact, if the effect of more competition
on use value is negative but is dominated by the effect on preemption value, we can even see opposite
effects. What’s more, we can see similar effects at play when resource combination is exclusive:
Proposition 6 If resource combination is exclusive, equilibrium development levels can be moving
in opposite directions (∂RH/∂θ > 0 while ∂RL/∂θ < 0) if the effect of more rivalry on use value is
negative while the combination of the effect on use value and preemption value is positive.
When resource combination is exclusive, more competition can unambiguously exacerbate the
gap between high (RH) and low (RL) development levels. This result stresses the complex interac-
tions between product market competition, strategic factor market and resource combination.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The relationship between determinants of value capture in the product market and resource value
in the factor market has been an open issue for resource-based theorists. They have made great
strides in understanding how rivalry in the product market affects the value resources can capture
(Chatain and Zemsky, 2011; Grahovac and Miller, 2009; Makadok, 2010). However, how product
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market rivalry affects resource prices, and thus resource development, on factor markets has not
been formally explored so far. This issue is of import for resource-based theorists as we know
comparatively little about the determinants of the supply of resources to factor markets.
This paper tackles this challenge by analyzing resource development while modeling competi-
tion in the both the strategic factor market and the product market. This symmetric treatment of
competition allows uncovering relationships between constructs that were not previously analyzed
together (Foss and Hallberg, 2013). Specifically, we now have a starting point for developing theory
linking rivalry and value capture in the product market to the supply of resources in the strategic
factor market.
Implications for empirical research
Thanks to this framework, researchers will be able to better specify empirical studies of resource
acquisition and resource development and test new hypotheses.
Proposition 1 shows that the combined value of resources and the extent of competitive overlap in
the product market jointly determine resource prices and resource concentration. It alerts empirical
researchers to control for both product market characteristics and the nature of resource combination
when studying the outcome of strategic factor market competition. For instance, while studies of
resource acquisition routinely examine the combined value of a target with a potential acquirer, they
tend to consider each acquisition in isolation and not to look at the combination value of several
targets together. Yet Proposition 1 shows that how targets may combine with each other influences
the eventual outcome of sales in the strategic factor market.
Proposition 2 suggests that, ceteris paribus, resource development patterns are qualitatively dif-
ferent in cases where resource development and deployment are separated and resources are sold to
a factor market relative to cases where resource development and deployment are integrated. When
the allocation of resources is the outcome of the operations of a strategic factor market, the model
suggests that resource development tends to be more intense. Moreover, when resource combina-
tion is exclusive, equilibrium development will be asymmetric and resources supplied on the factor
market will be heterogeneous even though suppliers of resources were initially symmetric.
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Such proposition can be empirically tested by following a research design similar to the one used
by Murray and colleagues’ (2009) study of open innovation and research outcomes. The idea is to
use a difference-in-differences approach to compare two parts of the same industry, with one where
the strategic factor market is shut down (or open) for exogenous reasons (e.g., changes in regulation)
and the other one serving as a control group.
Another implication is that, if resources acquired were overdeveloped to start with, buyers will
tend to do little to upgrade them once the acquisition is completed. In the case of a purely pre-
emptive acquisition, it means that the resources acquired will be simply left unused. Both of these
patterns have been observed in high technology contexts. For instance, Santos and Eisenhardt (2009)
document the acquisition of a technology startup firm followed by a shut down because the main
motivation for the acquisition was preemptive. There are also many recent examples of acquisition
of startups followed by service shutdown. This is such a well-known issue that when startup Sim-
perium was acquired in January 2013, its management felt necessary to post the following message,
mentioning both shutdowns and lack of investment, on their website: “You know how sometimes,
the services you love just disappear when they’re bought by someone else? Or they wither and die a
slow and painful death? Not the case here. We made sure of that.”13
These shutdowns are sometimes construed as acquisition mistakes, failure of integration, or seen
as reflecting the fact that buyers were more interested in the team than in the product (“acquihires”).
This paper’s framework provide a different rationale: the features that were created by the seller and
then shut down by the acquirer were developed to extract a high price in the strategic factor market
but were excessive relative to the actual needs of the acquirer.
The acquisitions of startups AdMob and Quattro in late 2009 by respectively Google and Apple
combines several of the ingredients of the model in a way consistent with Propositions 1 and 2. Both
startups were operating in a similar technological space (mobile advertising) and were developing
similar capabilities. Their combination would have likely been exclusive as the knowledge assets
and know-how they developed are similar. Moreover, Apple and Google seemed acutely aware that
13Quote from http://simplenote.com/2013/01/24/simplenote-supercharged/, retrieved June
21, 2013. For an extensive list of shutdowns post-acquisition (38 as of June 2013), see http://
ourincrediblejourney.tumblr.com/.
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a move to acquire one of these startups would negatively affect the other in the product market: after
Google acquired AdMob, Steve Jobs complained that Google bought AdMob because “they didn’t
want us to have them.”14
Industry observers noted that rivalry between Apple and Google in the startup acquisition mar-
ket mirrored increased rivalry in the mobile service product market. The two acquisitions were
contemporaneous (November 2009 for Admob and January 2010 for Quattro) and perceived as part
a continuing competitive interaction. Industry observers also agreed that the two startups differed
in quality, which was reflected in their respective price tags (a reported $750 million for AdMob, a
rumored $250million for Quattro). In the frame of this model, the exclusive nature of the resources
may have driven the outcome of the factor market competition as suggested by Proposition 1 as
well as the heterogeneity of the development efforts before the acquisition according to Proposition
2. After the acquisition, Quattro’s activities were shut down while AdMob’s founder left Google
almost a year after the acquisition among rumors that post-merger integration was difficult15
Propositions 3 and 4 imply that in the case of contracting before development, multiple con-
tingencies need to be controlled to explain the intensity of resource development. When resource
combination is exclusive, we may observe the shutdown of some projects (RL∗∗ = 0) even though
they were technically sound. Other factors such as synergies in benefits from resources (from the
convexity of the first argument of ΠB) will also matter and are likely to differ across markets. Fi-
nally, the negative effect of a competitor’s resources (the absolute value of ∂ΠB(0, y)/∂y) will also
need to be accounted for in order to compare resource development for sale to resource development
under contract.
Finally, Propositions 5 and 6 show that variation in rivalry levels in the product market can have
a significant impact on the supply of resources in the factor market. If rivalry changes over time,
then the incentives to develop resources will also change but differently for integrated developers
and for specialized developers. When the combination of resources is exclusive, we may also see
14Remarks by Steve Jobs recorded at the iPhone OS 4.0 Launch event, April 8, 2010, Cupertino, CA. Steve Jobs
jabs at Google Android, AdMob. YouTube Video: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V5XXEisgzdo, retrieved May 14,
2010.
15Jay Yarow, “Google’s AdMob Integration Is ‘Just Not Going Great’ ”, Business Insider, November 1, 2010, http:
//www.businessinsider.com/admob-google-2010-11, retrieved June 21, 2013.
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an increase in the heterogeneity of the resources that are offered for sale. This suggests to exploit
exogenous changes in product market rivalry (e.g., changes in competitive frictions) to empirically
test these propositions, by looking at development conduct before and after the shock in an industry,
while carefully constructing a comparison group not affected by the shock to use a difference-in-
differences estimator.
Implications for practitioners
Resource sellers – e.g., startup entrepreneurs, small biotechnology companies – can draw a few in-
sights from these results. If sellers can choose their buyers, they should not simply look for buyers
who have a need for the resource. They should also identify buyers that are locked in tight compet-
itive contests — facing competitors head-to-head in a high rivalry environment.16 Resource sellers
also have a clear interest in fueling rivalry between potential buyers. This can be achieved through
political strategies, for instance. One can imagine resource sellers covertly helping consumer groups
lobby to make a product market more competitive.
Moreover, sellers may want to make sure that their resources can be combined relatively smoothly
with comparable resources that are developed concurrently. Resources that are inferior and incom-
patible command lower prices because of their lower marginal contribution.
From the viewpoint of resource buyers, options may seem more limited. Unless they can contract
with sellers before development, the resources will be overdeveloped and overpriced. Even if they
can contract beforehand and get resources of the quality they prefer, sellers will still be able to extract
significant rents. This suggests that buyers may want to insulate themselves from factor markets in
order to avoid being squeezed by resource sellers. To credibly do so, they might invest to develop
their own development capabilities even if they are comparatively less efficient.
Ironically, relying on strategic factor markets to procure resources may be a riskier endeavor than
previously thought. It is well understood that factor markets may not give the opportunity for easy
economic profit (Barney, 1986). However, buyers of resources may be even more vulnerable when
16This is reminiscent of Rumelt’s (2011: 227) argument that innovations that help their users win competitions are
adopted faster.
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they are competing with each other in the product market (Asmussen, 2010). Buyers may want to
mitigate those risks by fostering more competition among sellers, for instance by subsidizing entry
on the supply side of factor markets.
Directions for future research
Future research can seek to analyze jointly the interaction of other key features of strategic factor
markets, product market competition as well as the process of resource accumulation. As argued by
Maritan and Peteraf (2011) resource acquisition and accumulation are deeply intertwined processes
that scholars have tended to study separately mainly for analytical convenience. In the same vein,
the internal organization of the firm has been shown to interact with rivalry in both factor markets
(Ross, 2012) and product markets (Sengul and Gimeno, 2013; Vroom, 2006) but we know little
about the tradeoffs involved with simultaneously organizing for rivalry in both types of markets.
Another approach to explore is to model interactions in the factor market in a cooperative game
framework (Lippman and Rumelt, 2003; MacDonald and Ryall, 2004; Brandenburger and Stuart,
1996, 2007). The potential emptiness of the core when there are externalities creates a hurdle,
but the greater generality of that approach might offer additional insights. Moreover, the outcome
of non-cooperative models of negotiation in the supply chain can sometimes be subsumed into a
cooperative game framework (e.g., de Fontenay and Gans, 2005).
The model could also be extended to include other actions by sellers, including the decision to
enter the market. Ghemawat (1990) shows that a dominant firm can keep buying whatever produc-
tion capacity is offered, depriving competitors of the opportunity to extend operations, but Krishna
(1993) suggests that other contingencies may reverse that result. Allowing for sequential entry in
conjunction with resource development and various resource integration scenarios would give us a
more comprehensive picture of competition in the factor market. Other relevant actions include the
horizontal differentiation of resources and the specialization of resources to specific product mar-
kets. Another line of inquiry is to explore the links between competition for factors and competition
for political influence (Capron and Chatain, 2008). If resource preemption matters to development,
actions in the political market, where regulations are determined, should also play a role.
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APPENDIX A: PROOFS
The proofs often rely on monotone comparative statics techniques. For an introduction to monotone compar-
ative statics from an applied modeler point of view, see Van Zandt (2002); for applications to oligopoly theory
see Vives (1999); for a more general treatment see Topkis (1998).
Proof of Proposition 1
Role of inequality (1) Summing up b11 > b21 and b12 > b22 as expressed in the text and simplifying
yields inequality (1). Thus, if inequality (1) is satisfied both resources are acquired by the same buyer. For
sufficiency, assume that each buyer buys one resource. The bids for resource R1, assuming that resource R2
goes to buyer B2, are as follows:
b11 = Π
B(R1, R2)−ΠB(0, g(R1, R2)), b12 = ΠB(g(R1, R2), 0)−ΠB(R2, R1).
Conversely, the bids for resource R2, assuming that resource R1 goes to buyer S1, are:
b21 = Π
B(g(R1, R2), 0)−ΠB(R1, R2), b22 = ΠB(R2, R1)−ΠB(0, g(R1, R2)).
These bids form an equilibrium whereby each buyer gets one resource if b11 ≥ b12 and b21 ≤ b22. Summing
inequalities b11 ≥ b12 and b21 ≤ b22 gives:
ΠB(R1, R2) + Π
B(R1, R2) ≥ ΠB(g(R1, R2), 0) + ΠB(0, g(R1, R2)),
which is equivalent to inequality (1) not holding.
Thus, if inequality (1) holds only one buyer buying the two resources can be an equilibrium. A similar
reasoning can be followed to show the converse claims.
Identity of the resource acquirers Because, by assumption, buyers B1 and B2 have similar valuations
their roles are interchangeable in each type of equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 2
Development by buyers: existence, symmetry, comparison with industry profit maximizing de-
velopment Buyer’s i objective function is Πi(Ri, R−i)−C(Ri). This function is submodular in (Ri, R−i)
and the development game is thus submodular. By a change of variable, a two-player submodular game can be
transformed into a supermodular game. A supermodular game always admits at least one pure strategy Nash
equilibrium (Vives, 1999). Because of the symmetry of the payoff functions, the best response functions are
symmetric as well. Because payoffs are twice continuous differentiable, the best response is continuous as
well. Thus a symmetric interior PSNE (RID, RID) exists.
Development by sellers: Existence Seller Si’s objective function is: ΠSi (Ri) = ΠB(Ri, R−i) −
ΠB(0, g(Ri, R−i))− C(Ri). This function is the sum of a strictly submodular function (ΠB(Ri, R−i))) and
of −ΠB(0, g(Ri, R−i)) which is itself submodular. Indeed, by Lemma 2.6.4 of Topkis (1998: 56), a decreas-
ing convex transformation of an increasing submodular function is supermodular. The function g(Ri, R−i) is
trivially submodular when it is additive or takes the maximum of its two arguments, and the second argument
of ΠB(., .) is convex by assumption. Consequently ΠB(0, Ri + R−i) is supermodular, which implies that
−ΠB(0, Ri +R−i) is submodular. The objective function is the sum of strictly submodular function and of a
submodular function and thus submodular. Thanks to this the development game is submodular. By a change
of variable, a two-player submodular game can be transformed into a supermodular game. A supermodular
game always admits at least one pure strategy Nash equilibrium (Vives, 1999).
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Symmetric equilibrium with additive resource combination when resources are bought by one
buyer Because of the symmetry of the payoff functions, the best response functions are symmetric as well.
Because payoffs are twice continuous differentiable, the best response is continuous as well. Thus a symmetric
interior PSNE (RAdditive, RAdditive) exists.
Asymmetric equilibrium with exclusive resource combination when resources are bought by
one buyer I use theorem Theorem 3.1 by Amir, Garcia and Knauff (2010: 1973) to show the existence
of asymmetric PNSEs and non-existence of symmetric PSNEs with exclusive resource combination. We
have already shown that ΠS was submodular. The key pre-condition to be shown is that the payoff function
ΠS(x, y) can be split in two different components, U(x, y) if x ≥ y and L(x, y) if x < y. Let:
U(x, y) = ΠSi (x, y) if x ≥ y
= ΠB(x, y)−ΠB(0, x)− C(x),
L(x, y) = ΠSi (x, y) if x < y
= ΠB(x, y)−ΠB(0, y)− C(x).
Because ∂ − ΠB(0, x)/∂x > 0 and ∂ − ΠB(0, y)/∂x = 0, it is the case that the derivative from the right of
U(x, x) in its first argument is strictly more than the derivative from the left of L(x, x) in its first argument,
as stated by Amir, Garcia and Knauff (2010: 1973).
Moreover, because of the strict concavity ofC(.), there exists a level of developmentRc such that V H < 0
for any development levels (Rc, R−j . This rules out Rj > Rc as being part of any best response and (Rc, Rc)
as an equilibrium. We can restrict the strategy space to Rj < c by defining c = Rc.
Similarly, because of our assumptions on C(.), it is always beneficial to develop the resource at a strictly
positive levelRj > 0 regardless of the level ofR−j . This rules out (0, 0) as an equilibrium and we can restrict
our attention to strictly positive strategies.
Thanks to the above, all conditions for Theorem 3.1 by Amir, Garcia and Knauff (2010: 1973) are
checked. It implies that no symmetric PSNE exists, and that at least one asymmetric PSNE exists.
Relative development levels Proof technique The method for the proof consists in showing that the best
response functions of the players in one game (the buyer resource development game) are always lower than
the other game (the seller resource development game). This implies that the symmetric equilibrium point,
which is where the best response function crosses the 45 degree line, of the former game is necessarily attained
for a lower level of resource development than in the latter game.
Proof of RAdditive > RID. In the integrated development game, Buyer Bi’s objective function is
Πi(Ri, R−i)−C(Ri). In the factor market development game, seller Si’s objective function is Πi(Ri, R−i)−
ΠB(0, Ri + R−i)− C(Ri). We have −∂ΠB(0, Ri + R−i)/∂Ri > 0, so the marginal return to development
by a seller is always strictly more than that of a buyer given R−i. This implies, by the principle of mono-
tone comparative statics, that a seller’s best response to R−i is always at a higher level than a buyer’s. This,
combined with the symmetry of the product functions, means that the best response function of the seller will
cross the 45 degree line (such that BRS(x) = x)for a value of development that is strictly higher that the
corresponding value for the buyer. Thus RAdditive > RID.
Proof ofRH > RID > RL. The objective function of a low level developer is Πi(Ri, R−i)−ΠB(0, R−i)−
C(Ri) which exhibit the same marginal returns to development at the objective function of a buyer. This im-
plies that their best response functions are identical wherever their domain corresponds. Let BR(x) the best
response function of the buyer. By assumption, we have RH > RL, but by definition of the asymmetric
equilibrium BR(RH) = RL < RH . To study the possible values of RL we can thus restrict our attention to
the domain whereBR(x) < x. Moreover by definition of the symmetric integrated development equilibrium,
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we have BR(RID) = RID. But, because of the assumption of strategic substitutability in resource levels and
on differentiability, this function is decreasing and continuous over its domain. This implies that RID is an
upper bound of any value that RL may take. Thus RID > RL.
The objective function of a seller developing at a high level with exclusive resource combination is
Πi(Ri, R−i) − ΠB(0, Ri) − C(Ri). We have −∂ΠB(0, Ri)/∂Ri > 0, so the marginal return to develop-
ment by a seller is always strictly more than that of a buyer given R−i. This implies, by the principle of
monotone comparative statics, that a high level seller’s best response to R−i is always at a higher level than
a buyer’s. We also know that the low level developer equilibrium strategy is less than that RID. This implies
RH > RID.
Symmetry of development in the additive case when resources are bought by different buyers
The first order conditions for a Nash equilibrium in resource development are:
∂ΠS1
∂R1
=
∂ΠB(R1 +R2, 0)
∂R1
− ∂Π
B(R2, R1)
∂R1
− ∂C(R1)
∂R1
,
∂ΠS2
∂R2
=
∂ΠB(R1 +R2, 0)
∂R2
− ∂Π
B(R1, R2)
∂R2
− ∂C(R2
∂R2
.
These are symmetric, and by our assumptions on ΠB and C best responses functions are also continuous.
There exists thus a symmetric equilibrium.
Asymmetry of development in the exclusive combination case when resources are bought by
different buyers The first order conditions for a Nash equilibrium in resource development, are:
∂ΠS
∂Ri
=
∂ΠB(Ri, 0)
∂Ri
− ∂Π
B(R−i, Ri)
∂Ri
− ∂C(Ri)
∂Ri
if Ri > R−i, (6)
∂ΠS
∂Ri
= −∂Π
B(Ri, R−i)
∂Ri
− ∂C(Ri
∂Ri
if Ri ≤ R−i. (7)
There is a discontinuity in the returns at Ri = R−i, where a slight increase in Ri brings a full
∂ΠB(Ri,0)
∂Ri
of additional marginal returns. This implies that Ri = R−i cannot be an equilibrium as each seller has
an incentive to deviate. Then, they cannot be any symmetric equilibrium since best response functions are
discontinuous atRj = R−j . The development levelsRH∗ andRL∗ are the solutions to the system of equations
(6)-(7).
Relative development levels when resources are bought by different buyers Proof of RH∗ >
RID. The profit function of the high development seller given the competitor’s action R−i is: ΠS =
ΠB(Ri, 0) − ΠB(R−i, Ri) − C(Ri). The marginal returns to increasing Ri are always strictly higher than
those of a buyer as: ∂Π
B(Ri,0)
∂Ri
> ∂Π
B(Ri,R−i
∂Ri
for R−i > 0 by the assumption on strategic substitutability and
∂−ΠB(R−i,Ri)
∂Ri
> 0. This implies that for anyR−i the best response of the seller is larger than that of the buyer.
Thus RH∗ > RID Proof of RAdditive∗ > RID. Consider the following profit function:
ΠS = ΠB(Ri, R−i)− C(Ri) + 1Additive · [−ΠB(Ri, R−i) + ΠB(Ri +R−i, 0)−ΠB(R−i, Ri)]
If 1Additive = 0 then this function is equal to the profit function of a buyer developing a resource. If If
1Additive = 1 then it is equal to that of a seller in the additive case. Following the principle of mono-
tone comparative statics, we only need to prove increasing differences in 1Additive and Ri in order to show
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RAdditive∗ > RID. This boils down to:
−∂Π
B(Ri, R−i)
∂Ri
+
∂ΠB(Ri +R−i, 0)
∂Ri
− ∂Π
B(R−i, Ri)
∂Ri
> 0.
But −∂ΠB(R−i,Ri)∂Ri > 0 and ΠB exhibits strategic substitutability. A sufficient condition for this condition to
be met is ∂2ΠB(x, y)/∂x2 > 0 which guarantees ∂Π
B(Ri+R−i,0)
∂Ri
> ∂Π
B(Ri,R−i)
∂Ri
for any R−i ≥ 0.
Proof of Proposition 3
(i) The profit function to be maximized (not accounting for transfers to the sellers, which are sunk) is:
ΠB(R1 +R2, 0)− C(R1)− C(R2).
The first order conditions do not entail corner solutions due to our assumptions on the shape of ΠB and
C. The optimal development levels are thus symmetric.
(ii) Suppose that optimal development levels are, without loss of generality R1 ≥ R2 with R2 > 0. Then
the profit of the buyer (not accounting for transfers to the sellers, which are sunk) is:
ΠB(R1, 0)− C(R1)− C(R2)
Profits can always be improved by setting R2 = 0s, contradicting the optimality assumption. Thus any
development such as R1 ≥ R2 > 0 cannot be optimal and optimal development requires setting the level of
development of one of the two resources at zero. Define RH∗∗ the high (non-zero) level of development and
RL∗∗ = 0 the low level of development.
(iii) Proof of RH∗∗ > RID. From (i) we know that the objective function of the buyer developing without
competition is equal to ΠB(Ri, 0)− C(Ri). The objective function of a buyer developing non-cooperatively
is ΠB(Ri, R−i) − C(Ri) with R−i > 0. But ∂Π
B(Ri,0)
∂Ri
> ∂Π
B(Ri,R−i)
∂Ri
and thus the optimal development
level RH∗∗ is always higher than that of a buyer developing under competition.
Proof ofRAdd∗∗ ≥ RID if ∂2ΠB(x, y)/∂x2 ≥ 0. If there are increasing returns to having a higher quality
combined resource (∂2ΠB(x, y)/∂x2 ≥ 0) then developing one resource increases the returns to developing
the other. The outcome is that each resource is more developed.
Proof of RAdd∗∗ ≥ RAdditive. Define R0 the development level that maximizes profits of a supplier in the
baseline supplier development game when the other supplier does not develop. By definition, R0 maximizes:
ΠB(R, 0)−ΠB(0, R)− C(R) (8)
Because of strategic substitutability of that game, we have R0 > RAdditive. Now, we look into the conditions
that lead to RAdd∗∗ and R0. Due to (i) above, RAdd∗∗ maximizes ΠB(2R, 0)− 2C(R) or, equivalently,
1
2
ΠB(2R, 0)− C(R). (9)
By the strict convexity of the first argument of ΠB we have:
∂
∂R
[1
2
ΠB(2R, 0)
]
>
∂ΠB(R, 0)
∂R
,
while −∂ΠB(0,R)∂R > 0. Thus, if the absolute value of ∂Π
B(0,R)
∂R is small enough relative to
∂ΠB(R,0)
∂R for all
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R, then RAdd∗∗, the maximizer of (9), is always more than R0, the maximizer of (8). And thus, RAdd∗∗ >
RAdditive.
Proof of RH∗∗ > RH . By definition, RH is the R that maximizes ΠB(R,RL)−ΠB(0, R)−C(R) while
RH∗∗ maximizes ΠB(R, 0) − C(R). We have ∂ΠB(R,RL)/∂R < ∂ΠB(R, 0)/∂R. By a similar argument
as above, RH∗∗ will be more than RH whenever ∂Π
B(0,R)
∂R is small relative to
∂ΠB(R,0)
∂R for all R.
Proof of Proposition 4
The proof closely follows the proof of Proposition 1 and is omitted.
Proof of Proposition 5
Let:
∂2ΠB(Ri +R
Additive, 0, θ)
∂θ∂Ri︸ ︷︷ ︸
Use value
−∂
2ΠB(RAdditive, Ri, θ)
∂θ∂Ri︸ ︷︷ ︸
Preemption value
> 0, at (RAdditive, θ0), (10)
and,
∂2ΠB(Ri, R
ID, θ)
∂θ∂Ri
< 0, at (RID, θ0), (11)
If inequality (10) is satisfied, then the objective function of a seller exhibits increasing differences in its action
Ri and θ. This implies by the principle of monotone comparative statics that the best response of the seller
moves up. By symmetry of the game, this implies that the symmetric pure strategy equilibrium RAdditive is
increasing. The same reasoning applies to the development level when sellers contract with buyers the terms
of the development.
The same reasoning is used to show the other points. Inequality (11), if satisfied, implies decreasing
differences, entailing a lower equilibrium development level RID. Both inequalities (10) and (11) can be
satisfied at the same time given the assumptions.
Proof of Proposition 6
Let:
∂2ΠB(Ri, R
H , θ)
∂θ∂Ri
< 0, at (RL, θ0), (12)
∂2ΠB(Ri, R
L, θ)
∂θ∂Ri
− ∂
2ΠB(0, Ri, θ)
∂θ∂Ri
> 0, at (RH , θ0). (13)
If both inequalities (12) and (13) are satisfied at the same time, then the best response of the high level
developer increases, while that of the low level developer decreases thanks respectively to increasing and
decreasing differences in own action Ri and θ. Since we have strategic substitutes in development levels, the
indirect strategic effect goes in the same direction as the direct effect.
APPENDIX B: ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIC FACTOR MARKET MODEL
In the base model resource suppliers sell their resources simultaneously. However, in actual factor markets,
sales may not be perfectly simultaneous. Are the results from the simultaneous sale model robust if sales
are sequential but suppliers do not know in advance the order in which the sales proceed? To answer this
question, this appendix analyzes a model where sales in the factor market are sequential, but the order of the
sales is randomly determined. In this alternative to the base model, the timing is as follows:
1. Sellers make their development decisions simultaneously.
2. The order of sale is randomly determined. With probability 1/2, seller S1 is designated the first seller
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(SF ) and S2 the second seller (SS). With probability 1/2, S1 is designated second seller (SS) and S2
first seller (SF ).
3. Seller SF enters the factor market and sells its resource in a second price auction. The buyers submit
bids. If bids are identical, the resource is randomly allocated to one of the two buyers (with each buyer
having a strictly positive probability of winning).
4. Seller SS enters the factor market and puts its resource to sale in a second price auction. If bids are
identical, the resource is randomly allocated to one of the two buyers (with each buyer having a strictly
positive probability of winning).
5. Buyers compete in the product market.
We use backward induction to find a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Fix the development levels of the
resources sold by Seller SF and SS at RF and RS respectively. For the factor market, we have the following
possible outcomes:
Seller SF sells 
resource F 
Seller SS sells 
resource S 
Seller SS sells 
resource S 
Resource F  
acquired by 
Buyer 1 
Resource F  
acquired by 
Buyer 2 
Resource S 
acquired by 
Buyer 1 
Resource S  
acquired by 
Buyer 2 
Resource S  
acquired by 
Buyer 1 
Resource S  
acquired by 
Buyer 2 
Buyer 1’s profits 
in the product 
market 
Buyer 2’s profits 
in the product 
market 
ΠB(g(RF,RS), 0) 
ΠB (0, g(RF,RS)) 
ΠB(RF, RS) 
ΠB (RS, RF) 
ΠB (RS, RF) 
ΠB(RF, RS) Π
B(g(RF,RS), 0) 
ΠB (0, g(RF,RS)) 
Figure 2: Sequential sales and product market outcomes
Sale of resource RS
Without loss of generality, assume that resource F was acquired by buyer B1. Then the bids for resource S
are respectively:
bidSB1 = Π
B(g(RF +RS), 0)−ΠB(RF , RS), bidSB2 = ΠB(RS , RF )−ΠB(0, g(RF +RS)).
If bidSB1 > bid
S
B2
then buyer B1 outbids buyer B2. This is the case if:
ΠB(g(RF +RS), 0)−ΠB(RF , RS) > ΠB(RS , RF )−ΠB(0, g(RF +RS)). (14)
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Condition (14) is the same as inequality (1) in the body of the paper – only the labels of the resources are
different (1 and 2 vs. S and F).
We can make the same analysis in the other branch of the tree, where resource F was acquired by buyerB2
in the first sale. Again, if inequality (14) holds, we find that resource S is bought by the buyer who previously
bought resource F. In that case, as this is a second price auction, the price paid for resource S is the bid of the
losing bidder:
pS(RF , RS) = Π
B(RS , RF )−ΠB(0, g(RF , RS)).
If inequality (14) does not hold, then resource S is bought by the buyer who did not buy resource F. The
transaction price is then:
pS(RF , RS) = Π
B(g(RF , RS), 0)−ΠB(RF , RS).
Since (14) is equivalent to (1), we have:
Proposition 7 For any given level of resource development, the eventual allocation of resources to buyers in
the alternative strategic factor market is identical to that of the base model.
Sale of resource RF
Moving up to the sale of resource F, consider first the case where inequality (14) holds. As shown above,
whoever buys resource F will also necessarily buy resource S. Each potential buyer then bids an amount
equal to the profits from owning the two resources versus the alternative of owning no resource (ΠB(g(RF +
RS), 0)− ΠB(0, g(RF , RS)) ), minus the cost of acquiring the second resource (pS(RF , RS)) in the second
sale. Thus:
bidFB1 = bid
F
B2 = Π
B(g(RF , RS), 0)−ΠB(0, g(RF , RS))− [ΠB(RS , RF ) + ΠB(0, g(RF , RS))]︸ ︷︷ ︸
pS(RF ,RS)
= ΠB(g(RF , RS), 0)−ΠB(RS , RF ).
Since buyers value the resources similarly the bids are tied, and the winner of the auction of the first resource
is randomly chosen.
In the case where inequality (14) does not hold, whoever buys resource F will necessarily not buy re-
source S. Each potential buyer then bids an amount equal to the profits from owning resource F versus the
alternative, which is owning resource S (ΠB(RF , RS)−Π(RS , RF ) ) minus the cost of acquiring resource S
(pS(RF , RS)). Thus:
bidFB1 = bid
F
B2 = Π
B(RF , RS)−Π(RS , RF )− [ΠB(g(RF , RS), 0)−ΠB(RF , RS)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
pS(RF ,RS)
= ΠB(g(RF , RS), 0)−Π(RS , RF ).
Expected revenues by sellers of resources
To sum up our results so far, if inequality (14) holds, one randomly determined buyer buys both resources at
prices:
pF (RF , RS) = Π
B(g(RF , RS), 0)−ΠB(RS , RF ),
pS(R1, R2) = Π
B(RS , RF )−ΠB(0, g(RF , RS)).
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If instead inequality (14) does not hold, one randomly determined buyer buys resource 1 and the other resource
2. The prices are then:
pF (RF , RS) = Π
B(g(RF , RS), 0)−ΠB(RS , RF ),
pS(RF , RS) = Π
B(g(RF , RS), 0)−ΠB(RF , RS).
We can calculate the expected revenues in each of these cases: seller Si expects to be the first (SF ) to sell
with probability 1/2, and to be second to sell (SS) with probability 1/2.
Case 1: Assume (14) holds
If inequality (14) holds, seller’s Si expected revenues are thus:
ReviAlt =
1
2
[
ΠB(g(Ri, R−i), 0)−ΠB(R−i, Ri) + ΠB(Ri, R−i)−ΠB(0, g(Ri, R−i))
]
.
By contrast, in the main model (see proposition 2), the revenues of seller Si are:
ReviBase = Π
B(Ri, R−i)−ΠB(0, g(Ri, R−i)).
We have:
ReviAlt −ReviBase =
1
2
[ΠB(g(Ri, R−i), 0)−ΠB(R−i, Ri) + ΠB(Ri, R−i)−ΠB(0, g(Ri, R−i))]
−ΠB(Ri, R−i) + ΠB(0, g(Ri, R−i))
=
1
2
[ΠB(g(Ri, R−i), 0) + ΠB(0, g(Ri, R−i))−ΠB(R−i, Ri)−ΠB(Ri, R−i)]
> 0.
The last inequality is satisfied by assumption as it is simply half of (14). This establishes that expected
revenues in the alternative model are always strictly higher as in the base model in this case.
Case 2: Assume (14) does not hold
If inequality (14) does not hold, seller’s Si expected revenues are thus:
ReviAlt =
1
2
[
ΠB(g(Ri, R−i), 0)−ΠB(R−i, Ri)
]
+
1
2
[
ΠB(g(Ri, R−i), 0)−ΠB(R−i, Ri)
]
= ΠB(g(Ri, R−i), 0)−ΠB(R−i, Ri).
But the revenues in that case, in the main model are (see proposition 2):
ReviBase = Π
B(g(Ri, R−i), 0)−ΠB(R−i, Ri).
Thus, if inequality (14) does not hold, ReviAlt = Rev
i
Base.
We can conclude from this analysis:
Proposition 8 For given levels of resource development, expected seller revenues are at least as high in the
alternative model than in the base model.
Equilibrium development levels in the alternative model relative to the base model
In this section we compare the equilibrium development levels (under competition) in stage 1 of the alternative
game to those in the base model. The analytical approach uses the principle of monotone comparative statics
(Topkis, 1998) applied to supermodular games (Vives, 1999) in a similar manner as in the proof of Proposition
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2. The profit functions of the suppliers can be written as:
ΠSi = Rev
i
Base + 1Alt ·
[
ReviAlt −ReviBase
]− C(Ri), i ∈ {1, 2}.
If 1Alt = 0, we have the base game. If 1Alt = 1, we have the alternative game. We can use the tools developed
by Topkis (1998: 183) and Vives (1999) to compare the Nash equilibria of these two games. Specifically, if
∂
∂Ri
(ReviAlt−ReviBase) ≥ 0 then best responses in the alternative game for both suppliers will be larger than
in the base game. We now find sufficient conditions that guarantee this.
Case 1: Assume (14) holds
We have, in the general case:
∂(ReviAlt −ReviBase)
∂Ri
=
1
2
[
∂ΠB(g(Ri, R−i), 0)
∂Ri
− ∂Π
B(Ri, R−i)
∂Ri
+
∂ΠB(0, g(Ri, R−i))
∂Ri
− ∂Π
B(R−i, Ri)
∂Ri
]
.
Additive case Consider now the additive case (i.e., when g(x, y) = x+ y). In this case, we have:
∂(ReviAlt −ReviBase)
∂Ri
=
1
2
[
∂ΠB(Ri +R−i, 0)
∂Ri
− ∂Π
B(Ri, R−i)
∂Ri
+
∂ΠB(0, Ri +R−i)
∂Ri
− ∂Π
B(R−i, Ri)
∂Ri
]
.
We now show that a sufficient condition for ∂∂Ri (Rev
i
Alt − ReviID) ≥ 0 is the convexity of ΠB(x, y) in both
its arguments. Indeed, on the one hand, we have:
∂ΠB(Ri +R−i, 0)
∂Ri
≥ ∂Π
B(Ri +R−i, R−i)
∂Ri
≥ ∂Π(Ri, R−i)
∂Ri
.
The first inequality follows from the decreasing marginal returns of ΠB (since ∂2ΠB(x, y)/∂x∂y < 0 and
R−i ≥ 0) , the second is due to the convexity of the first argument of Π (∂2Π(x, y)/∂x2 > 0). Thus:
∂ΠB(Ri +R−i, 0)
∂Ri
− ∂Π(Ri, R−i)
∂Ri
≥ 0. (15)
On the other hand, we have:
∂Π(0, Ri +R−i)
∂Ri
≥ ∂Π
B(0, Ri)
∂Ri
≥ ∂Π
B(R−i, Ri)
∂Ri
.
The first inequality follows from the convexity of the second argument of ΠB (∂2Π(x, y)/∂y2 > 0) , the
second is due to the decreasing marginal returns of ΠB (i.e., ∂2ΠB(x, y)/∂x∂y < 0 and Ri ≥ 0). Thus:
∂Π(0, Ri +R−i)
∂Ri
− ∂Π
B(R−i, Ri)
∂Ri
≥ 0. (16)
Taking (15) and (16) together implies ∂∂Ri (Rev
i
Alt − ReviBase) ≥ 0 in the additive case. Consequently,
following the principle of monotone comparative static, symmetric Nash equilibrium development levels
in the additive version of the alternative game will be superior to those of the base game. That is, denot-
ing (RAdditive−Alt, RAdditive−Alt) the Nash equilibrium of the alternative game, we have: RAdditive−Alt ≥
RAdditive.
49
Exclusive case In the exclusive case, if Ri ≥ R−i, we have, due to the decreasing marginal returns of ΠB
(i.e., ∂2ΠB(x, y)/∂x∂y < 0:
∂(ReviAlt −ReviBase)
∂Ri
=
1
2
[
∂ΠB(Ri, 0)
∂Ri
− ∂Π
B(Ri, R−i)
∂Ri
+
∂ΠB(0, Ri)
∂Ri
− ∂Π
B(R−i, Ri)
∂Ri
]
≥ 0.
This means that returns to development are always higher in the alternative model than in the base model for
the agent who develops more than the competitor.
If Ri < R−i, we have instead:
∂(ReviAlt −ReviBase)
∂Ri
=
1
2
[
∂ΠB(0, 0)
∂Ri
− ∂Π
B(Ri, R−i)
∂Ri
+
∂ΠB(0, 0)
∂Ri
− ∂Π
B(R−i, Ri)
∂Ri
]
=
1
2
[
−∂Π
B(Ri, R−i)
∂Ri
− ∂Π
B(R−i, Ri)
∂Ri
]
Recall that ∂ΠBx, y/∂x > 0 while ∂ΠBx, y/∂y < 0. Thus a sufficient condition to ensure that the expression
above is negative is: ∣∣∣∣∂ΠB(x, y)∂x
∣∣∣∣ ≥ ∣∣∣∣∂ΠB(x, y)∂y
∣∣∣∣ .
This condition means that a marginal increase in one’s resource level has more absolute effect effect than a
marginal increase in the competitor’s resource level.
With this assumption, because ΠB exhibits decreasing differences (i.e., strategic substitutes), this is
enough to ensure that results in the base model still hold in the alternative model. Indeed, following the
structure of the proof of Proposition 2 in the base model we can shwo that in the alternative model the firm
developing at a high level would develop at an even higher level while the firm developing at a low level
would develop at an even lower level.
We thus have:
Proposition 9 Assume inequality (14) holds.
 If resources are additive, and ΠB is convex in both arguments, then symmetric development levels are
at least as high as in the base model. That is, denoting (RAdditive|Alt, RAdditive|Alt) the Nash equilibrium of
the alternative game, we have: RAdditive|Alt ≥ RAdditive.
 If resources are exclusive, and a marginal increase in one’s resource level has more absolute effect
effect than a marginal increase in the competitor’s resource level, pure strategy development Nash equilibria
are asymmetric. Moreover, the high level of development in the alternative model is higher than the high level
of development in the base model, while the low level of development in the alternative model is lower than the
low level of development in the base model. That is, development levels in any asymmetric Nash equilibrium
of the alternative game take the values RH|Alt and RL|Alt and we have RH|Alt ≥ RH and RL|Alt ≤ RL
The assumption that ΠB is convex in both arguments is a weak one. It is satisfied in most models of
product market competition where resources allow for improvement of quality or reduction of cost, including
those in which our assumption that resources are strategic substitutes holds as well (Athey and Schmutzler,
2001).
Similarly, the assumption that a marginal increase in one’s resource level has more absolute effect effect
than a marginal increase in the competitor’s resource level is intuitive.
Case 2: Assume (14) does not holds
As seen above, if inequality (14) does not hold, the revenues are identical to those in the base model (i.e.,
ReviAlt −ReviBase = 0), and thus all results in the main body of the paper hold as they are.
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Proposition 10 Assume inequality (14) does not hold. The alternative and the base model are identical.
Summary of findings
In summary:
• If (14) does not hold: results in the alternative model are exactly the same as in the base model.
• If (14) holds and resources are additive, we only need the additional assumption of convex first com-
ponent of Π to guarantee at least as strong results in the alternative model as in the base model. This
assumption is verified in all basic IO models.
• If (14) holds and resources are exclusive, we only need the additional assumption that deploying a
resource for oneself has a higher absolute effect on profits than deployment by a competitor.
The sufficient conditions that guarantee stronger development levels in the alternative model compared to
the base model are weak, as they are intuitive and will be verified in most applications of interest to strategy
research. Moreover, these conditions are merely sufficient. This means that both the base and the alternative
model share similar broad characteristics. Using one or the other model will not lead to qualitatively different
conclusions except in some unusual cases.
APPENDIX C: RESOURCE DEPLOYMENT AND PROFITS IN THE BERTRAND LIN-
EAR DIFFERENTIATED MODEL
Consider the following demand system where θ measures how the price set by a competitor affects a firm’s
demand:
q1 = a− p1 + θp2, q2 = a− p2 + θp1.
Firm profits are given by:
Π1 = (p1 − (c1 −R))q1, Π1 = (p2 − c2)q2.
where R is a resource reducing marginal costs for firm 1. Firms compete in prices. Equilibrium prices and
quantities are:
p∗1 =
2a+ θ(a+ c2) + 2(c1 −R)
4− θ2 , p
∗
2 =
2a+ θ(a+ c1 −R) + 2c2)
4− θ2
Profits are:
Π1 =
(2a− 2c1 +R(2− θ2) + θ(a+ c2) + θ2c1)2
(4− θ2)2 Π2 =
(2a− 2c2 + θ(a+ c1 −R) + θ2c2)2
(4− θ2)2
We have:
∂Π1
∂R
=
2
(
2− θ2) (aθ + 2a+ c1 (θ2 − 2)+ c2θ + θ2(−R) + 2R)
(4− θ2)2 ,
∂2Π1
∂R2
=
2
(
θ2 − 2)2
(4− θ2)2 > 0
∂2Π1
∂θ∂R
=
2
(
aθ4 + 4aθ3 + 6aθ2 − 8a+ 8c1
(
θ2 − 2) θ + c2 (θ4 + 6θ2 − 8)− 8θ3R+ 16θR)
(4− θ2)3
Let a = 4, θ = 0.95, c1 = c2 = 0.2. Then: ∂Π1∂R = 2.69,
∂2Π1
∂θ∂R = −0.31 < 0..
Let a = 4, θ = 0.50, c1 = c2 = 0.2. Then: ∂Π1∂R = 2.41,
∂2Π1
∂θ∂R = 1.00 > 0.
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